Adversarial Exposure Attack on Diabetic Retinopathy Imagery by Cheng, Yupeng et al.
Adversarial Exposure Attack on Diabetic Retinopathy Imagery
Yupeng Cheng1, Felix Juefei-Xu2, Qing Guo1∗, Huazhu Fu3, Xiaofei Xie1,
Shang-Wei Lin1, Weisi Lin1, Yang Liu1
1 Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
2 Alibaba Group, USA
3 Inception Institute of Artificial Intelligence (IIAI), UAE
Abstract
Diabetic retinopathy (DR) is a leading cause of vision loss in
the world and numerous cutting-edge works have built pow-
erful deep neural networks (DNNs) to automatically classify
the DR cases via the retinal fundus images (RFIs). However,
RFIs are usually affected by the widely existing camera expo-
sure while the robustness of DNNs to the exposure are rarely
explored. In this paper, we study this problem from the view-
point of adversarial attack and identify a totally new task, i.e.,
adversarial exposure attack generating adversarial images by
tuning image exposure to mislead the DNNs with signifi-
cantly high transferability. To this end, we first implement
a straightforward method, i.e., multiplicative-perturbation-
based exposure attack, and reveal the big challenges of this
new task. Then, to make the adversarial image naturalness,
we propose the adversarial bracketed exposure fusion that re-
gards the exposure attack as an element-wise bracketed expo-
sure fusion problem in the Laplacian-pyramid space. More-
over, to realize high transferability, we further propose the
convolutional bracketed exposure fusion where the element-
wise multiplicative operation is extended to the convolution.
We validate our method on the real public DR dataset with the
advanced DNNs, e.g., ResNet50, MobileNet, and Efficient-
Net, showing our method can achieve high image quality and
success rate of the transfer attack. Our method reveals the
potential threats to the DNN-based DR automated diagnosis
and can definitely benefit the development of exposure-robust
automated DR diagnosis method in the future.
1 Introduction
Diabetic retinopathy (DR) is the leading cause of vision im-
pairment and blindness among working-age adults globally
(Lee, Wong, and Sabanayagam 2015b). DR is an eye dis-
ease associated with diabetes and if DR can be detected in
time, the progression to vision loss can be slowed or even
averted. Currently, the DR detection is primarily a manual
process that is time-consuming and requires trained clini-
cians to evaluate the digital retinal fundus images (RFIs).
Time is the essence here because delayed results can lead
to delayed treatment, or even lost follow-up communica-
tion. Therefore, the need for an automated DR detection and
screening method has long been recognized.
DNN-based automated medical imagery recognition has
become more popular nowadays, as an aid to human experts.
∗Qing Guo is the corresponding author: tsingqguo@gmail.com.
Figure 1: A normal retinal fundus image (left) is correctly classi-
fied as ‘non-DR’ by a pretrained ResNet50. After performing our
adversarial exposure attack, the corresponding adversarial example
is mis-predicted as ‘moderate DR’.
With the fast development of DNN-based image analysis
and recognition techniques, we are allowing less human in-
tervention and over time, the recognition system can become
fully automated. DR detection based on retinal fundus image
analysis is one such popular domain where automated DNN-
based system is deployed (Gulshan et al. 2016; Mansour
2018; Gargeya and Leng 2017). For example, Kaggle built a
DR detection competition and the DR is labeled as five lev-
els: ‘0’ for no DR, ‘1’ for mild DR, ‘2’ for moderate DR, ‘3’
for severe DR, and ‘4’ for proliferative DR, which has draw
great attention (Lee, Wong, and Sabanayagam 2015a).
With its apparent advantage of being efficient, the DNN-
based DR detection does have some caveats, especially
when faced with fundus images that exhibit various degra-
dations. Low quality fundus images can lead to higher un-
certainty in clinical observation and a risk of misdiagnosis.
One major cause of low quality in retinal fundus images is
uneven illumination or exposure. This is partly caused by
the fact that the retina cannot be illuminated internally and
both incident and reflected imaging beams have to traverse
the pupil and partly by the spherical geometry of the eye
that creates significant inter-reflection, resulting in shading
artifacts (Shen et al. 2020).
In this work, we set out to reveal such a vulnerability for
DNN-based DR detection by carefully tuning the image ex-
posure to mislead the DNNs, and we name the new task: the
adversarial exposure attack. We first implement a straight-
forward method, i.e., multiplicative-perturbation-based ex-
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posure attack, and reveal the big challenges of this new task.
Then, to achieve high image quality, we propose the adver-
sarial bracketed exposure fusion that regards the exposure
attack as an element-wise bracketed exposure fusion prob-
lem in the Laplacian-pyramid space. Moreover, to realize
high transferability, we further propose the convolutional
bracketed exposure fusion where the multiplicative fusion
is extended to the element-wise convolution. We have vali-
dated our method on a real public DR dataset with the pow-
erful DNNs, e.g., ResNet50, MobileNet, and EfficientNet,
and shown that our method can not only achieve high im-
age quality but high success rate of the transfer attack. In
a larger sense, our method reveals the potential threats to
the DNN-based DR automated diagnosis and can definitely
benefit the development of exposure-robust automated DR
diagnosis method in the future.
2 Related Work
2.1 Diabetic Retinopathy Grading
The traditional automatically DR grading methods are based
on hand-crafted features. They utilized retinopathic mani-
festations including exudates, hemorrhages, hemes and mi-
croaneurysms as well as normal retina components such as
blood vessels and optic discs. Silberman et al. (Silberman
et al. 2010) extract SIFT features from input images. After-
wards, it trains a support vector machine (SVM) classifier
to recognize the exudates in the retinal image and predicts
different stages of DR depending on the result. Akram et al.
(Akram et al. 2014) uses filter banks and a hybrid classi-
fier, which is consist of m-Mediods based model and Gaus-
sian mixture model, to realize lesion detection for grading of
DR. Kumar et al. (Kumar et al. 2017) extends the multivari-
ate generalized-Gaussian distribution to a reproducing ker-
nel Hilbert space to generate a kernel generalized-Gaussian
mixture model (KGGMM) for robust statistical learning.
In the past few years, many researchers address this prob-
lem with the help of deep neural network (DNN). Yang et
al. (Yang et al. 2017) utilizes the annotations of location in-
formation, e.g., microaneurysms etc., to design a two-stage
DNN network for joint lesion detection and DR grading.
Gargeya et al. (Gargeya and Leng 2017) identify DR sever-
ity with a DNN classification model for diagnosing DR. Be-
sides, some articles tried to explore and utilize the inter-
nal relationship between DR and diabetic macular edema
(DME) to improve the performance in grading both dis-
eases. Gulshan et al. (Gulshan et al. 2016) built a DNN
model based on Inception-v3 architecture for grading DR
and DME. After that, Krause et al. (Krause et al. 2018) out-
performed it with Inception-v4 architecture. More recently,
CANet (Li et al. 2019) integrates a disease-specific attention
module as well as a disease-dependent attention module in a
unit network to further improve the overall performance on
grading DR and DME. Although achieving great progress,
existing works do not consider the influence of a common
phenomenon, i.e., camera exposure, that is frequently hap-
pened in the diagnosis process.
Figure 2: Recognition visualization results of an example input (a)
and adversarial examples (b-d) generated by different realizations
of our method in Sec. 3. (b) is produced by EQ. 1. (c) is produced
by bracketed exposure fusion (BEF). (d) is produced by convo-
lutional bracketed exposure fusion (CBEF). Ground truth label is
listed on the top-left of input image. For each adversarial examples,
the predictions of three models, i.e., ResNet50, MobileNet, Effi-
cientNet, are listed on the top-left. Two values on the bottom refer
to their image quality assessment values, i.e., SSIM and BRISQUE.
2.2 Adversarial Attack
Although DNN techniques facilitate the artificial intelligent
in terms of many aspects, including image classification (He
et al. 2016), detection (He et al. 2017), as well as the tasks
in medical field. However, recent studies show that just tiny
perturbation, called adversarial exampel, can totally mislead
the prediction result of a well-trained DNN model (Szegedy
et al. 2013). Generally, there are two kinds of adversarial at-
tacks: whitebox attack and blackbox attack. In the setting of
whitebox attack, the attack method can fully access the DNN
model. Szegedy et al. (Szegedy et al. 2013) first address the
generation of adversarial examples as a optimization prob-
lem. Goodfellow et al. then propose a one-stop method to
efficiently produce adversarial examples named as fast gra-
dient sign method (FGSM). Afterwards, Kurakin et al. (Ku-
rakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016) utilize iterative opti-
mization to improve its performance. Before long, Dong et
al. (Dong et al. 2018) further upgrade this method by ap-
plying the momentum term. Recently, Dong et al. (Dong
et al. 2019) also explore how to enhance the transferability
of adversarial examples. Other kinds of whitebox attacks,
such as DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard
2016), sacrifices the time complexity generating tiny per-
turbations in a simple way. Papernot et al. (Papernot et al.
2016) achieves the adversarial attack by restricting the `0
norm, which perturbs only a few pixels in the image. Su et
al. (Su, Vargas, and Sakurai 2019) propose an attack method
conducting adversarial attack with merely one pixel’s mod-
ification. Carlini et al. (Carlini and Wagner 2017) produces
extremely imperceptible perturbations by optimizing crafted
object functions under different norms. Except the additive
attacks, Guo et al. (Guo et al. 2020b) recently introduce a
innovative way that attacks the input by blurring operation.
Blackbox attack means that the attacker has no prior infor-
mation of the target DNN model. In that case, Chen et al.
(Chen et al. 2017) produce adversarial examples by estimat-
ing the gradients of the target model. Some works (Baluja
and Fischer 2017; Hayes and Danezis 2017) train an attacker
neural network to realize blackbox attack. Besides, Guo et
al. (Guo et al. 2019) propose a simple way of construct-
ing the adversarial perturbation in discrete cosine transform
2
(DCT) space and reach similar blackbox attack capability,
yet, with less searching steps. More recently, Wang et al.
(Wang et al. 2019) achieve blackbox attack through morph-
ing way.
Note that, existing adversarial attacks mainly focus on the
additive noise perturbation that could not be found in our
daily life and could not help analyze the effects of real-world
degradation, e.g., camera exposure. In this work, we propose
a totally novel exposure-based adversarial attack simulat-
ing the real bracketed exposure fusion in the photographer,
which would help reveal the potential threats to DNN-based
DR automated diagnosis.
3 Methodology
3.1 Adversarial Exposure Attack on DR Imagery
Following the general camera exposure process, we can rep-
resent an exposure-degraded DR image (Xe) as the multi-
plication between a clean image X and an exposure map E
having the same size with X, i.e.,
Xe = XE (1)
where  represents the element-wise multiplication.
Like existing additive-perturbation-based adversarial attacks
(Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014), we can naively re-
alize a multiplicative-perturbation-based adversarial attack
against a pre-trained DNN (i.e., φ(·)) by optimizing the fol-
lowing objective function
argmax
E
J(φ(XE), y), subject to ‖E− 1‖p <  (2)
where J(·) represents the image classification loss function,
i.e., the cross-entropy function, and y is the ground truth cat-
egory of the X.  controls the perturbation degree.
Although above method is simple and easy to implement,
we argue that it cannot realize the desired exposure attack:
¶ camera exposure usually leads to spatial-smooth varia-
tion across the DR images. However, above method gener-
ates noise-like DR images (e.g., Fig. 2 (b)) that are easily
perceived and can be hardly regarded as the natural camera
exposure factor, thus is less meaningful for the exposure-
robustness analysis of DNNs. To address this problem, we
propose the adversarial bracketed exposure fusion based at-
tack in Sec. 3.2 that can generate local smooth variation with
the Laplacian pyramid representation and adversarial tuned
fusion weight maps. · From the viewpoint of adversarial
attack, above method can hardly achieve high transferability
where the adversarial exposure example is generated from
one DNN and used to attack another one. To alleviate this
challenge, we further extend the multiplicative to the convo-
lution perturbation with which we can realize high transfer-
ability with spatial-smooth intensity variation.
3.2 Adversarial Bracketed Exposure Fusion
(BEF)
To generate adversarial and spatial smooth exposure, we re-
gard it as a bracketed exposure fusion problem (Mertens,
Kautz, and Van Reeth 2009) where multi bracketed exposure
images are first generated and fused within the Laplacian-
pyramid space. The fusion weight maps for all images are
tuned to let the image can fool DNNs.
Bracketed exposure sequence generation. Exposure
bracketing is a well-known term in the photographer where
one picture is taken at a given exposure, one or more
brighter, and one or more darker, helping generate the most
satisfactory image. Inspired by this technique, given a DR
image X, we generate an exposure sequence {Xi}Ni=1 by
Xi = X · 2ei (3)
where ei denotes the exposure shifting value and we set it
in a range of [−λ, λ] with λ > 0. Intuitively, when we have
ei > 0 the X would be brighter otherwise darker.
Bracketed exposure fusion. To avoid generating noise-
like patterns, we conduct fusion in the Laplacian-pyramid
space. Similar solution has been adopted in image blending.
Specifically, we decompose each bracketed exposure image,
e.g., Xi to a Laplacian pyramid (LP) representation. The
process is represented as L(Xi) = {Xˆli}Ll=1 where Xˆli de-
notes the l-th level decomposition of the Xi. Moreover, for
each Xˆli, we assign a weight map denoted asW
l
i having the
same size with Xˆli. Then, we can fuse the bracketed expo-
sure images with their weight maps at each level
Xˆe,l =
N∑
i=1
Wli  Xˆli, subject to
N∑
i=1
Wli = 1, (4)
where the constraint term means the {Wli} should be nor-
malized at each level. Then, the fusion results of all levels,
i.e., {Xˆe,l}Ll=1, are used to reconstruct the final result
Xe = L−1({Xˆe,l}Ll=1) = L−1
(
{
N∑
i=1
Wli  Xˆli}Ll=1
)
, (5)
where L−1(·) denotes the inverse LP decomposition. With
Eq. 5, we can define the adversarial bracketed exposure fu-
sion based attack, that is, we can tune all weight maps to let
the final fused DR image fool DNNs
argmax
{Wli}
J
(
φ
(
L−1
(
{
N∑
i=1
Wli  Xˆli}Ll=1
))
, y
)
, (6)
subject to ∀l,
N∑
i=1
Wli = 1.
As shown in Fig. 2, the proposed BEF attack can gener-
ate noiseless and naturalness adversarial examples. Never-
theless, according to our evaluation, such attack still can-
not help achieve high transferability across different models.
One possible reason is that the linear fusion via element-
wise weight maps is hard to represent complex perturbation
patterns that could fool DNNs.
3.3 Convolutional Bracketed Exposure Fusion
(CBEF)
To address the low transferability of the adversarial brack-
eted exposure fusion based attack, we extend the element-
wise linear fusion to the convolutional way with more pa-
rameters can be tuned. Specifically, we represent Eq. 5, as
Xe = L−1({Xˆe,l}Ll=1) = L−1
(
{
N∑
i=1
Kli ~ Xˆli}Ll=1
)
, (7)
3
where ~ denotes the element-wise convolution where each
position of Xˆli has been processed by a corresponding kernel
in Kli. For example, if we have Xˆ
l
i ∈ RH×W , the kernel
should be Kli ∈ RH×W×K
2
, that is, the p-th element of
Xˆli,p is proposed a kernelK
l
i,p ∈ RK×K that is the reshaped
version of the p-th element ofKli. We denoteK as the kernel
size. With Eq. 7, we can reformulate Eq. 6 as
argmax
{Kli}
J
(
φ
(
L−1
(
{
N∑
i=1
Kli ~ Xˆli}Ll=1
))
, y
)
, (8)
subject to ∀l,
N∑
i=1
∑
p,q
Kli,p,q = 1.
3.4 Optimization and Attack Algorithm
For each kernel, we use the sign gradient descent to optimize
Eq. 6 and have
Kli,t = K
l
i,t−1 + α sign(∇Kli,t−1J), (9)
where sign(·) denotes the sign function function and α is
the optimizing stepsize. The attacking process can be sim-
ply summarized as follows: First, we initialize the kernel K
as an identity version where Xˆli = K
l
i ~ Xˆli. Second, we
calculate Xe via Eq. 7. Then, we calculate the loss via J(·)
in Eq. 9 and perform back-propagation and update K via
Eq. 9. After that, we go back to the second step to further
optimization till the maximum iteration number is reached.
4 Experiments
In this section, we demonstrate the attack capability as well
as transferability of our method. We first describe the exper-
imental setting in Sec. 4.1. Then, we report the comparison
results with six additive-perturbation-based baseline meth-
ods in Sec. 4.2. Finally, we also explore the influence of each
component on the transfer attack of our method in Sec. 4.3.
4.1 Setup
Dataset. In this part, we conduct our experiments on
the EyePACS 2015 dataset (Lee, Wong, and Sabanayagam
2015a), which is one of the largest retinal image dataset and
used in many recent DR related works (Gargeya and Leng
2017; Zhou et al. 2019). The DR is graded from 0-4 indi-
cating the severities of patients1. To be specific, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4
refer to No DR, mild DR, moderate DR, severe DR and pro-
liferative DR, respecitively.
Metrics. We select the success rate for the evaluation of at-
tack capability. Besides, our adversarial output should keep
a satisfactory image quality for human vision system since
a retinal fundus image with severe perturbation would be
easily wiped off by doctors or operating staff. As a result,
image quality assessment (IQA) is also introduced in our
experiments. We choose structural similarity (SSIM) (Wang
1Detailed information about the dataset could be found in https://www.
kaggle.com/c/diabetic-retinopathy-detection
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Figure 3: Attack success rate along with SSIM and BRISQUE for
six baseline methods and our two attacks, i.e., BEF and CBEF. Our
curves are generated by tuning attack step size α in Eq. 9 from
0.005 to 0.1. For the six additive-perturbation-based attacks, we
tune the maximum perturbation ranges from 16 to 64 with the max
intensity of 255.
et al. 2004) as our IQA metric for it considering the per-
ceived change in structural information. Moreover, a non-
reference IQA metric is also introduce in our experiments,
i.e., dubbed blind/referenceless image spatial quality evalu-
ator (BRISQUE) (Mittal, Moorthy, and Bovik 2012), to fur-
ther evaluate the naturalness of images for human beings.
Overall, we select attack success rate, SSIM and BRISQUE
for evaluating the performance of our method as well as all
of the baselines.
Models. To evaluate the attack capability of our method
against to different neural networks, we introduce three
widely-used models including ResNet50 (He et al. 2016),
MobileNet (Howard et al. 2017) and EfficientNet (Tan and
Le 2019). They are all pre-trained on ImageNet dataset and
fine-tuned on the EyePACS dataset, achieving top recogni-
tion accuracy.
Baselines. We choose six advanced additive-perturbation-
based adversarial attacks as the baseline methods: fast gradi-
ent sign method (FGSM) (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2014), iterative fast gradient sign method (IFGSM) (Ku-
rakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016), momentum iterative
fast gradient sign method (MIFGSM) (Dong et al. 2018),
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Figure 4: Visualization results of adversarial examples crafted for the ResNet50, using our methods, i.e., BEF and CBEF, as well as six
baseline attacks. For each image, its DR grading result through ResNet50 is displayed on the top-left. Two numbers at the bottom are SSIM,
and BRISQUE values. The five inputs (1st column) are correctly classified to their ground truth DR grade, and the numbered label can be
used to gauge the classification of all the remaining attack algorithms (column 2-8).
as well as their translation-invariant (TI) version proposed
in (Dong et al. 2019) which are denoted as TIFGSM, TI-
IFGSM, and TIMIFGSM, respectively.
4.2 Comparison with Baseline Methods
Quantitative Analysis. We first demonstrate the attack
capability of our method by evaluating the adversarial exam-
ples crafted for ResNet50. We should compare all methods
based on the image quality of adversarial examples as well
as the attack success rate for fair comparison. Therefore,
we tune parameters for different attacks to generate multiple
success rate-SSIM/BRISQUE curves for clear visualization
comparison. To be concrete, we tune the maximum pertur-
bation value of additive-perturbation-based attacks ranging
from 16 to 64 and the step size of our attack methods (i.e.,
BEF and CBEF), i.e., α in Eq. 9, from 0.005 to 0.1.
We show the comparison results in Fig. 3 and have the fol-
lowing observations: ¶ Most attacks achieve almost 100%
attack success rate indicating that our methods and baselines
have enough capability in attacking the target model. · Al-
though most attacks have a similar success rate of 100%,
their image qualities are various. MIFGSM, TIMIFGSM
and TIIFGSM outperform other baselines as well as our
CBEF in terms of SSIM metric, while they are all beaten by
our BEF. Specifically, TIMIFGSM has a best SSIM value
of 0.95 among baselines, and the best SSIM value of our
CBEF is only 0.7. However, the lowest SSIM value of BEF
is 0.97 which outperforms all attack methods with similar
attack success rate. We mainly attribute the advantage of
BEF to the Laplacian pyramid fusion process, which effec-
tively depress the noise pattern. Compared with additive-
perturbation-based attacks and BEF, our CBEF perturbs the
input image by mutating each pixel through its neighbours
in all exposure images, leading to higher transferability as
well as weakness in SSIM metric. In contrast to the SSIM
metric, our two attacks have a significant advantage when
considering BRISQUE metric. Both methods have similar
BRISQUE values around 20, surpassing all results of base-
lines. It proves that our attack methods show a perceptible
change comparing with original image, but they still keep a
satisfactory quality in terms of human vision system.
Qualitative Analysis. To illustrate the advantage of our
method in detail, we visualize several examples in Fig-
ure. 4 and observe that BEF keeps the best image quality,
and CBEF takes the second place in terms of BRISQUE.
Specifically, the SSIM values of TIIFGSM are 0.807 for the
first case, which is the same with TIMIFGSM and followed
by 0.686 of IFGSM as well as MIFGSM, while our BEF
achieves the best value of 0.958. Our CBEF result gener-
ated from this case gets a SSIM value of only 0.668. But,
for the fourth case, our CBEF obtains the SSIM value of
0.76, which is better than the best baseline result 0.736 of
5
Crafted from ResNet50 MobileNet EfficientNet
Attacked model MobileNet EfficientNet ResNet50 ResNet50 EfficientNet MobileNet ResNet50 MobileNet EfficientNet
FGSM 13.6 14.8 11.0 7.7 11.7 10.7 7.5 10.2 13.9
TIFGSM 13.7 14.7 11.0 7.7 11.7 10.5 7.4 10.3 20.2
IFGSM 14.3 15.2 100 47.4 21.6 100 54.7 21.9 100
TIIFGSM 62.9 18.9 100 15.8 14.1 100 14.4 32.2 100
MIFGSM 14.0 15.0 100 18.3 21.5 100 26.6 16.8 100
TIMIFGSM 57.8 20.9 100 13.6 15.5 100 12.6 24.4 100
BEF (ours) 9.5 10.9 98.6 7.8 8.1 99.7 9.1 8.7 98.1
CBEF (ours) 84.6 81.8 99.6 37.0 82.9 100 24.9 47.1 99.6
Table 1: Adversarial comparison results on EyePACS dataset. It contains the success rates (%) of transfer & whitebox adversarial attacks
among three fine-tuned models: ResNet50, MobileNet, and EfficientNet, using six baseline methods with maximum perturbation of 32 and
two versions of our method, i.e., BEF and CBEF. For each three columns, the whitebox attack results are shown in the last one. The first and
second columns exhibit the transfer attack results. We highlight the top three results with red, yellow, and green, respectively.
TIIFGSM. Considering the BRISQUE, TIIFGSM and TIM-
IFGSM are both 37.39 for the last case, which are the best
among all baselines, while our BEF and CBEF get 12.9 and
25.94, respectively. The visualization results show that our
CBEF method tends to mislead the DNN model with over
exposure operation, which takes major responsibility for the
weakness of our method in terms of SSIM metric. Never-
theless, due to the Laplacian pyramid fusion process in our
framework, our results have rarely noise-like patterns in our
adversarial results, which commonly occurs in the additive-
perturbation-based baselines. The noise-free outputs finally
bring us the best (i.e., lowest) BRISQUE values. Moreover,
the over exposure pattern of the CBEF results with respect to
attack task indicates that DR grading is sensitive to exposure
change and lower contrast.
4.3 Ablation study
In this section, we first test the success rate of transfer at-
tack, i.e., transferability, of BEF and CBEF. Then, we fur-
ther study the influence of multiple hyper-parameters intro-
duced in Sec. 3 on our transferability, including the level
L of Laplacian pyramid space in adversarial bracketed ex-
posure fusion as well as the kernel size K in convolutional
bracketed exposure fusion.
Comparison on Transferability. Transferability refers to
the attack capability of adversary in attacking one target
model with the adversarial examples crafted from another
model. It is important to evaluate the transferability as it in-
dicates the potential ability in realizing effective blackbox
attack which is more consistent with the attack problem in
physical world. For fair comparison, we conduct the trans-
ferability experiment with the adversarial examples having
similar image quality. Considering the performance of both
SSIM and BRISQUE for all baselines and our methods in
Fig. 3, we finally choose 32 for all additive-perturbation-
based baselines and 0.01 for step size in our methods.
We first craft adversarial examples from the three models,
e.g., ResNet50, MobileNet and EfficientNet, respectively,
and feed them to each model for evaluation. At last, we
get nine attack success rates for each attack method includ-
ing three whitebox attacks and six transfer attacks. Table 1
shows the results. Generally, we draw a similar conclusion
that most baselines as well as our methods, i.e., BEF and
CBEF, achieve almost 100% success rate when they imple-
ment whitebox attack. Besides, we have following observa-
tions in terms of transferability: ¶ Although BEF shows a
significant advantage in image quality, its transferability is
lower than most baselines. Considering the adversarial ex-
ample crafted from MobileNet, the whitebox attack of BEF
and CBEF achieve similar success rates of 99.7% and 100%.
However, the transfer attack to ResNet50 and EfficientNet
by BEF only has success rates of 7.8% and 8.1%, even lower
than FGSM and TIFGSM. · CBEF sacrifices image quality
comparing with BEF, exchanging strong transferability. The
transfer attack against to EfficientNet by CBEF using adver-
sarial examples crafted from MobileNet has a success rate of
82.9%, which is the best among all methods. And the trans-
fer attack success rate for ResNet50 is 37%, lying on the
second place which follows 47.4% of IFGSM. We can find
similar results on other two models.
Effects of the number of pyramid level L. As mentioned
in Sec. 3, we introduce the Laplacian-pyramid space to over-
come the noise pattern generated by simple fusion of Eq. 1.
Here, we tune the pyramid level L in Eq. 4 and Eq. 7 to
check its influence on the attack success rate of BEF and
CBEF. Specifically, we set L = 1, 3, 5 in this experiment
and generate three different versions for BEF and CBEF, re-
spectively. Note that, L = 1 refers to no pyramid fusion
process is applied. The results are shown in Table. 2.
First, the whitebox attacks under BEF and CBEF are af-
fected by the increase of L. Taking ResNet50 as an example,
the whitebox attack success rates of BEF and CBEF with no
pyramid (L = 1) are 100%. However, as L increases, the
success rates drop to 94.6% and 98.9%, respectively. Sec-
ond, the success rate of transfer attack of BEF is heavily
affected by L. For example, when we conduct the transfer
attack to MobileNet and EfficientNet with the adversarial
examples crafted from ResNet50, BEF has the success rates
of 45.2% and 45.7% with L = 1. However, when we in-
troduce pyramid fusion and set L = 3, the transfer attack
success rates of BEF decrease to 9.5% and 10.9%. More-
over, as we increase L to 5, the success rates keep dropping
to 8.6% and 10.7%.
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Crafted from ResNet50 MobileNet EfficientNet
Attacked model MobileNet EfficientNet ResNet50 ResNet50 EfficientNet MobileNet ResNet50 MobileNet EfficientNet
BEF (L = 1) 45.2 45.7 100 46.2 65.7 100 64 80.9 100
BEF (L = 3) 9.5 10.9 98.6 7.8 8.1 99.7 9.1 8.7 98.1
BEF (L = 5) 8.6 10.7 94.6 7.7 7.4 96.2 7.7 6.6 84.2
CBEF (L = 1) 31.2 29.3 100 33.8 33.1 100 56.7 76.3 100
CBEF (L = 3) 84.6 81.8 99.6 37.0 82.9 100 24.9 47.1 99.6
CBEF (L = 5) 25.2 29.7 98.9 38.6 59.7 98.0 50.3 28.3 88.9
Table 2: Adversarial comparison results on EyePACS dataset. It contains the success rates (%) of transfer & whitebox adversarial attacks
on three fine-tuned models: ResNet50, MobileNet, and EfficientNet, using our methods, i.e., BEF and CBEF, with different number of
Laplacian-pyramid level (L = 1, 3, 5). For each three columns, the whitebox attack results are shown in the last one. The first and second
columns exhibit the transfer attack results.
Crafted from ResNet50 MobileNet EfficientNet
(L, K) MobileNet EfficientNet ResNet50 ResNet50 EfficientNet MobileNet ResNet50 MobileNet EfficientNet
(1, 1) 45.2 45.7 100 46.2 65.7 100 64 80.9 100
(1, 3) 31.2 29.3 100 33.8 33.1 100 56.7 76.3 100
(1, 5) 30.6 27.5 100 39.4 32.5 100 61.5 71.2 100
(3, 1) 9.5 10.9 98.6 7.8 8.1 99.7 9.1 8.7 98.1
(3, 3) 84.6 81.8 99.6 37.0 82.9 100 24.9 47.1 99.6
(3, 5) 36.5 37.3 94.9 28.4 62.2 99.9 15.7 32.0 99.8
Table 3: Adversarial comparison results on EyePACS dataset. It contains the success rates (%) of transfer & whitebox adversarial attacks
among three fine-tuned models: ResNet50, MobileNet, and EfficientNet, using our method with different settings of pyramid level (L = 1, 3)
and kernel sizes (K = 1, 3, 5). For each three columns, the whitebox attack results are shown in the last one. The first and second columns
exhibit the transfer attack results.
Above two observations indicate the negative effect of
pyramid fusion for the success rate of attack. It brings ben-
efit for image quality and damage for attack capability in
the meantime. In contrast, the CBEF conquers this trend by
extending the element-wise weight to the convolution ker-
nel. More specifically, the CBEF, with pyramid fusion level
L = 3, achieves the transfer attack success rates of 84.6%
and 81.8% when it attacks MobileNet and EfficientNet us-
ing adversarial examples crafted from ResNet50. These are
higher than that results of setting L = 1. Such results
hint that convolution-based attack benefits the high success
rate of transfer attack. However, we also observe that when
L = 1 the CBEF has lower success rate than BEF. We argue
that this phenomenon is directly related to the kernel size for
CBEF. Please find detailed explanation in the following.
Effects of the kernel size K. We have show the advan-
tages of convolutional bracketed exposure fusion in improv-
ing the transferability. Here, we further conduct an exper-
iment to study the influence of kernel size K in Eq. 7 on
the transferability of CBEF under different pyramid settings.
More specifically, we pick two pyramid fusion level, i.e.,
L = 1, 3, and tune the kernel size K = 1, 3, 5 in our ex-
periment. The results are shown in Table. 3.
It can be seen that, when L = 1, transfer attack success
rate drops with the increase of kernel size. However, when
L = 3, the success rate of transfer attack increase with the
K from 1 to 3 and drop again with K from 3 to 5. Consid-
ering the same kernel size, e.g., K = 3, the success rates of
transfer attack increase significantly. We have similar results
when K = 5. However, when K = 1, i.e., the CBEF is de-
graded to BEF, the attack success rate reduces significantly.
Overall, both kernel size K and number of the pyramid
level affect the success rate of transfer attack significantly.
5 Conclusion
We proposed a novel adversarial attack method, i.e., adver-
sarial exposure attack, to show the potential threat of cam-
era exposure to automated DNN-based diabetic retinopathy
(DR) diagnostic system. We first demonstrated challenges
of this new task through a straightforward method, i.e.,
multiplicative-perturbation-based exposure attack, where
the naturalness of the exposure, i.e., inherent smooth prop-
erty, cannot be maintained. Then, we proposed the adver-
sarial bracketed exposure fusion based attack in which the
attack is formulated as the fusion problem of bracketed
exposure sequence. The element-wise multiplicative fusion
weight maps can be tuned to generate realistic adversarial
exposure examples. Moreover, we further proposed an en-
hanced version by extending the multiplicative fusion to the
convolution operation that helps achieve significantly high
success rate of the transfer attack. We have validated our
method on a real and popular DR detection dataset, demon-
strating that our method can generate high image quality of
adversarial examples and high success rate of the transfer
attack. We think this work would help develop exposure-
robustness DNN-based automated DR diagnostic system.
This paper explored the exposure attack for classification.
However, its influence on other tasks, e.g., visual object
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tracking (Guo et al. 2020c,a, 2017a,b; Zhou et al. 2017),
natural image classification (Guo et al. 2020b), face recog-
nition (Wang et al. 2020c), etc., are also worthy of study.
Moreover, we plan to investigate the interplay of exposure
attack with other attack models (Cheng et al. 2020; Chan
et al. 2018; Sun et al. 2020; Zhai et al. 2020) as well as the
studies (Huang et al. 2020c; Wang et al. 2020b; Qi et al.
2020; Huang et al. 2020b,a; Wang et al. 2020a) related to
the DeepFake problems.
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